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Abstract
This paper studies the interactions of ﬁscal and monetary policies in the presence of ﬁscal spillovers
within a monetary union. When capital markets are integrated, the ﬁscal policy of any member country
will inﬂuence equilibrium wages and interest rates across the whole union. Thus there are ﬁscal spillovers
within a federation. Within a general class of monetary policy rules, there does not exist one that
completely insulates agents in one region from ﬁscal policy in another. We contrast particular rules, such
as inﬂation and interest rate targeting, to illustrate how monetary policy becomes a channel for ﬁscal
policy spillovers.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the interactions of ﬁscal and monetary policies in the presence of ﬁscal spillovers within
a monetary union. We ask whether in such a federation there exists a monetary policy rule that insulates
agents in one region from the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in another. Our main ﬁnding is that such insulation is
impossible.
One of the gains from the integration of capital markets between countries is a more eﬃcient allocation
of capital across economies. But, at the same time, integration implies that the ﬁscal policy of one country
will impact agents in all countries through relative prices.
∗Russell Cooper is grateful to the NSF for ﬁnancial support. We thank for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts
seminar participants at the University of Texas, the Bank of Canada, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Banque de
France, European Central Bank, University of Bern, Cardiﬀ Business School, the University of Melbourne, Bocconi, University,
the University of California at Davis, the Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance, the Universidad de San Andresas well
as participants to the T2M 2009 conference, the Banco de Espana conference on ”Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal
Policy” (2010), and the ESWM 2010 (Shangha¨ ı).
†Department of Economics, European University Institute, Florence Italy and Department of Economics, University of
Texas, Austin, TX. 78712, russellcoop@gmail.com
‡Banque de France and Paris School of Economics, kempf@univ-paris1.fr
§Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel, dpeled@econ.haifa.ac.il
11 INTRODUCTION
One way to deal with these ﬁscal spillovers is through the coordination of ﬁscal policy between the various
policymakers active in the monetary union. But doing so can run against the political pressure of national
constituencies.
Alternatively, working through the institutional design of the union, countries will attempt to insulate
their economies from the ﬁscal policies of others. This can be achieved both through restrictions on ﬁscal
policy of member countries and through commitment to various monetary policy rules.
The goal of this paper is to study the second of these two components of insulation: the eﬀects of
monetary policy on ﬁscal spillovers. One direct connection between monetary policy and ﬁscal conditions
arises in a debt crisis when a central bank ﬁnances a bail-out (see Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2010)).
Even if a monetary authority can commit not to directly respond to ﬁscal measures of a member coun-
try, there are more subtle channels of interaction across countries within a federation operating through
a monetary authority. Generally, the ﬁscal (debt) policies of large regions may impact equilibrium prices,
which we term “ﬁscal spillover”. Depending on the monetary rule in place, debt policy may elicit a response
by the monetary authority. If, for example, the central bank responds to variations in prices, then ﬁscal
spillovers create a dependence of monetary policy on regional ﬁscal policy. This response might not be
termed a “bailout” since any reaction of the monetary authority appears to be part of the normal operating
procedure of the central bank. Thus our analysis highlights the inescapable interplay between ﬁscal policy
and monetary rules. The choice of monetary policy rules will impact on the conduct and consequences of
ﬁscal policy by governments within a federation.
We explore these issues in a multi-region overlapping generations model with money, capital and bonds.
In this model, a monetary policy rule speciﬁes region speciﬁc transfers as a function of economy aggregates.
We study the eﬀects of the debt issued by one region on the steady state of this economy, focusing on
spillovers from one region to another.
This paper is motivated by the institutional structure of the European Monetary Union. This is a
leading example of a federation in which member states conduct independent ﬁscal policies yet there is a
single central bank. Further, within the EMU there is no central ﬁscal authority. Thus the responsibility
for any insulation falls to the ECB. In this context, our paper focuses on how the rules of the ECB interact
with ﬁscal spillovers and why it cannot guarantee ﬁscal insulation.
In our analysis, we provide suﬃcient conditions on monetary policy for crowding out: an increase in the
debt of one region reduces the capital stock of the federation. We further argue that there does not exist a
monetary policy rule which would eliminate these ﬁscal spillovers. In particular, there is no monetary policy
rule which makes the equilibrium allocation of region 2 agents independent of region 1 ﬁscal policy. That
is, region 2 agents cannot be insulated from the level of region 1 debt. Moreover, no monetary policy rule
can prevent equilibrium consumptions of agents in the two regions and the capital stock from varying with
region 1 ﬁscal policy. From these two ﬁndings we conclude that steady state allocations cannot be insulated
from the ﬁscal policy of region 1.
To complement this general ﬁnding, we also provide a comparison of two commonly studied rules, one
which ﬁxes money growth and those which peg an interest rate.1 Intuitively, one might conjecture that
1Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) also compare interest rate and money growth rules in the presence of cash-in-advance and
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apparently weak monetary rules such as pegging the interest rate would facilitate the redistribution of tax
burdens. If a region runs a deﬁcit, selling its debt will impact interest rates. A monetary authority striving
to peg interest rates may be induced to monetize the regional debt. In doing so, it would tax the money
holdings of other agents. In contrast, a strong monetary authority would ﬁx the growth rate of the money
supply and thus be immune to ﬁscal pressures.
We ﬁnd that this intuition is misleading in a multi-region economy. First, even when the money growth
rate is ﬁxed, ﬁscal policy of one region can inﬂuence real money demand and thus the real value of monetary
transfers. Second, by pegging an interest rate, the monetary authority can actually protect agents from the
inﬂation tax. This occurs when the monetary authority is pegging the same interest rate that agents’ obtain
on their portfolios.
We also use our framework to highlight the interaction between the eﬀects of monetary policy and market
structure. If, for example, some agents do not save through intermediaries, then these agents will bear any
inﬂation tax induced by ﬁscal actions of a regional government. If all capital ﬂows are eliminated across
regions, then there will exist a monetary policy to insulate agents of one region from the ﬁscal actions of
other regional governments. In this case, insulation is possible but it requires the complete disintegration of
capital market links.
2 Multi-Region Model
We study a multi-region (multi-country) inﬁnite overlapping generations model with three stores of value:
capital, money and bonds.2 Agents live for two periods in one of two regions, i = 1,2. The size of each
generation is normalized to 1 with a fraction ηi of the agents living in region i = 1,2.
As our focus is on the interaction between the regions and the choice of monetary rules, we study the
unique monetary steady state of the overlapping generations model. Thus the presentation of the basic
model ignores time subscripts.
2.1 Households
Households are endowed with one unit of time in youth which is inelastically supplied to the labor market
in return for a real wage ω. Consumption occurs in both youth and old age. Hence, households consume a
portion of their wage and save the rest via an intermediary which pays a real rate of return R.
The household in region i receives a transfer gi from its regional government in the ﬁrst period and pays
a tax of τi
t in period t = y,o for i = 1,2 where t = y denotes youth and t = o denotes old age. The household






portfolio restrictions in a single region monetary economy. In this paper, these two extreme policies are meant to illustrate the
potential for interaction across the two regions.




y = ω + gi − τi
y − s and ci
o = sR − τi




Here R is interpreted as the rate of return oﬀered by competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries, described
below. These intermediaries are open to all agents regardless of region (country). Thus ﬁnancial markets
are fully integrated.
Let s(ω,R,τy,τo) denote the savings function of a household.3 We assume sR(ω,R,τy,τo) > 0 so that
the substitution eﬀect dominates and, as usual, sω(ω,R,τy,τo) > 0.
2.2 Firms
Firms in both regions have access to the same constant returns to scale technology which converts labor (L)
and capital (K) into the single consumption good: Y = F(K,L). Firms maximize proﬁts of F(K,L)−ωL−rK
leading to ω = FL(K,L) and r = FK(K,L). If k ≡ K
L is the per worker capital stock, then these ﬁrst order
conditions become ω = f(k) − kf′(k) and r = f′(k) where f(k) = F(k,1). Capital fully depreciates in the
production process.
2.3 Regional Governments
The government in region 1, denoted RG1, is the sole active government.4 It transfers an exogenous amount
g1 to young agents of each generation and levies taxes on young and old agents. It issues a quantity B1, per
region 1 agent, of one-period debt in each period. In addition, it receives a real transfer from the central
bank of T 1, per region 1 agent.
For this analysis, the ﬁscal policy of RG1 is characterized by the amount of debt it issues, B1. The
diﬀerence between government transfers and taxes collected from young agents is ﬁnanced by issuing debt.
The taxes collected from old agents plus the real value of transfers from the central bank, T 1, are used to
retire the debt in the next period.5 These ﬂows are summarized by
B1 = g1 − τ1
y, B1r = τ1
o + T 1. (3)
Here the region 1 government must pay the same return on its debt, r, paid to lenders by ﬁrms.
Region 2 does not make transfers to young agents, g2 = 0. However, depending on the nature of operations
of the central bank, the region 2 government receives transfers, T 2, which are then rebated to old agents,
τ2
o = −T 2.
2.4 Intermediaries
There are intermediaries who provide the link between households and assets (loans to ﬁrms and government
debt) and these intermediaries are subject to a reserve requirement. This reserve requirement creates a
3The dependence of s(·) on g is suppressed since g is held constant throughout the analysis.
4This exercise could also be viewed as characterizing the marginal eﬀects of region 1 ﬁscal policy given the ﬁscal policy of
region 2.
5Thus the budget balance requirement is within a generation and abstracts from any intergenerational transfers.
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demand for money even when the return on bonds and loans exceeds the return on money.6
The intermediaries take in total deposit, S =
P
i ηisi, and lend them to ﬁrms, k, and to the region 1
government, b. There is a reserve requirement that a fraction λ of the deposit must be held as money. Hence
M
p
= λS and b + k = (1 − λ)S. (4)
The return on deposits R satisﬁes




where r is, as above, the rental rate on capital, and π is one plus the inﬂation rate. Government bonds, as
they compete with loans in the portfolio of the intermediary, must also have a return of r.
2.5 Central Bank
The Central Bank (CB) controls the supply of money. Changes in the supply of money are brought about
through transfers to regional governments and thus to agents in those regions.7
Let T(k,b) be the total transfer function of the CB where k is the per capita capital stock in the economy
and b is the per capita level of region 1 debt, where b = η1B1.8 We characterize the conduct of monetary
policy and its dependence on the aggregate state of the economy, summarized by the state vector (k,b),
through this transfer function. We do not consider monetary policy rules dependent upon region speciﬁc
variables.
In general, both regional governments receive transfers from the CB. The region i government receives a
transfer of φ
iT(k,b) from the CB, where φ
i ∈ [0,1] and
P
i φ
i = 1. The transfer T(k,b) is per capita in the
federation. Denote by T i(k,b) the transfer per capita made to region i agents: ηiT i(k,b) = φ
iT(k,b).9
We assume the CB is able to commit to a monetary policy rule, deﬁned by a transfer function, T(k,b),
along with the shares, (φ
1,φ
2). We explore the implications of T(k,b) for the ﬁscal policy of region 1. The
policy response of the CB noted in the introduction is embedded in the transfer function.
In our analysis, we also emphasize three particular monetary policy rules. The ﬁrst is an inﬂation target
in which the CB commits to a money growth rate. The second is an interest rate rule in which the CB
commits to target an interest rate.10 Finally, we study a rule in which the CB pays interest in reserves. For
a given rule, we specify the corresponding T(k,b) policy function of the CB.
6The introduction of a reserve requirement follows Smith (1994).
7We do not consider open market operations. In some settings, as discussed in Smith (1994) these two forms of monetary
operations may not be equivalent.
8In the analysis, we use B1 when referring to the debt (per member of region 1) of a regional government and use b as the
debt of region 1 per capita to describe equilibrium objects.
9Thus the total transfer is T(k,b) =
P
i ηiTi(k,b).
10We explore a variety of pegs distinguished by which rate is pegged.
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2.6 Equilibrium Conditions
We focus on steady state equilibrium of this economy, given a stock of region 1 debt. We then characterize
the dependence of the steady state equilibrium on regional debt.
Given a transfer function, T(k,b) and ﬁscal policy of region 1, b, a steady state equilibrium satisﬁes the
following conditions:






y = ω + gi − τi
y − si, ci
o = Rsi − τi
o (7)
for i = 1,2.








o + T 1, (8)
and
g2 = τ2
y = 0, τ2
o = −T 2. (9)
• factor market equilibrium conditions: ω(k) = f(k) − kf′(k) and r(k) = f′(k).
• zero-proﬁt condition for intermediary: R = (1 − λ)r(k) + λ
π.
Given the assumption of constant returns to scale, the number of producers is not determined in equi-
librium. We assume that there is a single ﬁrm producing, hiring workers from all regions.
The integration of capital markets implies that in each period, the markets of money, capital rentals,
labor and government bonds must clear. The functions ω(k) and r(k) guarantee that the markets for capital
and labor clear at the given levels of factor supply. The market for government bonds will clear as long as
the government pays the market clearing rate of interest.
Finally, the rate of inﬂation is determined by the growth in the money supply which in turn depends on
the transfer policy of the CB. In particular, the change in the nominal money supply equals the nominal
value of the total transfers:
Mt+1 − Mt = pt+1T(k,b). (10)
Let σ(k,b) be deﬁned as one plus the rate of money growth, so
Mt+1 − Mt = (σ(k,b) − 1)Mt. (11)
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(k + b). (12)
From this, (5) and using π = σ in steady state, the return on deposits depends on the transfer function,







Putting these conditions together, we can rewrite the ﬁrst-order conditions for the households in regions


















R(k,b)s2 + T 2(k,b)
￿
. (15)
These two conditions, since they incorporate the regional governments’ budget constraints, factor market
clearing and the determination of the return on deposits, are used for the equilibrium analysis. Together,
(13)-(15) along with (4) determine the equilibrium values of (s1,s2,k) given a transfer function, T(k,b), a
level of b and φ
i, i = 1,2.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
The analysis characterizes two types of steady state equilibria. The ﬁrst occurs when the reserve requirement
is not binding so that money earns the same return as other assets. In this case, there may be no ﬁscal
spillovers from regional ﬁscal policy.
The second corresponds to an economy in which the reserve requirement binds. Then, the ﬁscal policy
of one region is not neutral and instead impacts on equilibrium wages and interest rates. That is, there are
ﬁscal spillovers.
3.1 Non-binding Reserve Requirements
As a benchmark, we start the analysis by studying economies in which the reserve requirement does not
bind. Then, the rates of return on money, capital and bonds must be equal in equilibrium.11 In equilibrium,
(14) and (15) hold with R = r. Since the reserve requirement does not bind, (12) does not hold.
We distinguish two cases: one in which the transfer function depends on k only and a second in which
transfers depend directly on b. These two cases are economically important. If the CB conditions its policy
on b, then its response to the ﬁscal policy of the regional government is direct: changes in the amount of
11A stationary monetary equilibrium exists in an overlapping generation model with real assets, no productivity growth and
no asset markets frictions if and only if the real rate of return on assets in the non-monetary equilibrium is lower than the
population growth rate.
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regional debt elicits a monetary response. In this case, it is not surprising that ﬁscal policy of one region
has monetary consequences. If, instead, the CB conditions policy only on k, then the link between regional
ﬁscal actions and a monetary response will be indirect. This dependence of monetary policy on capital arises
from the dependence of wages and interest rates on the capital stock.
As we shall see, when reserve requirements are not binding, ﬁscal spillovers are absent if the transfer
function depends only on k. In this case, the only way ﬁscal spillovers can arise is if they are created by a
monetary policy which is directly dependent on b.
3.1.1 Transfer Function Independent of b
Suppose the transfer function depends only on k. Any feedback of monetary policy is through variations in k
induced by the regional ﬁscal policy. From the next proposition, the steady state equilibrium is independent
of the ﬁscal policy of region 1. Thus, in the steady state equilibrium, the transfers are independent of the
region 1 policy.
Proposition 1 If Tb(k,b) ≡ 0, then the steady state equilibrium is independent of b.
Proof. The ﬁrst-order conditions and consumption levels are given by (14) and (15). At a monetary
steady state equilibrium with a non-binding reserve requirement, R(k,b) = r(k). With the assumption of
Tb(k,b) ≡ 0, the only impact of region 1 ﬁscal policy on these conditions is through the term b
η1 in (14). In
particular, T 1 and T 2 do not depend on b by assumption, and r(k) = 1
σ = 1 − T
Q where Q is real money
balances. Accordingly, the ﬁrst-order condition for region 1 agents determines only the diﬀerence between
saving and bonds in that region, (s1 − b
η1). Real money balances, Q = η1s1 + η2s2 − k − b, do not depend
on b as (s1 − b
η1) is invariant to b. Thus variations in region 1 debt are matched by variations in the saving
of that region.
This is a standard Ricardian result. Essentially region 1 conducts ﬁscal policy in isolation from region 2
and from the CB. Variations in taxes set in youth inﬂuence the level of debt and taxes in the future. House-
holds in region 1 fully anticipate the link between current and future taxes and adjust savings accordingly.
There are no equilibrium eﬀects of region 1 ﬁscal policy. That is, equilibrium interest rates and wages are
independent of b
η1. In equilibrium the transfers of the CB are independent of the ﬁscal policy of region 1.
3.1.2 Transfer Function Dependent on b
Consider Tb(k,b)  = 0 so the CB is induced to respond to region 1 ﬁscal policy directly. That is, even if
region 1 policy has no direct eﬀect on the capital stock, the CB responds directly to variations in b. Given
this direct dependence of monetary policy on the per capita debt in the economy, it is not surprising that
the steady state depends on the ﬁscal policy stance of region 1.
Proposition 2 If Tb(k,b)  = 0, then the steady state equilibrium depends upon b.
Proof. The conditions for equilibrium at the steady state are given by (14) and (15).
The equilibrium determines (s1 − b
η1,s2,k). By assumption, T 1(k,b) and T 2(k,b) vary with b, given k.
Hence (14) and (15) cannot hold at diﬀerent values of b if (s1 − b
η1,s2,k) remains unchanged.
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There are equilibrium eﬀects of region 1 ﬁscal policy through a CB rule in which Tb(k,b)  = 0. If this was
the only link between regions, a policy of limiting ﬁscal spillovers would be simple: the CB should adopt a
rule in which Tb(k,b) ≡ 0.
3.2 Binding Reserve Requirements
In this section, we study an economy in which the reserve requirement is binding. This friction in asset
markets breaks the equalization of returns on money and other assets and will lead to a couple of important
ﬁndings. First, Ricardian equivalence fails: the ﬁscal policy choice of region 1 will have real eﬀects on the
capital stock and thus on wages and interest rates. Second, unless the CB adopts a rule in which T(k,b) is
independent of (k,b), the ﬁscal policy of region 1 will induce a monetary policy response.
We study steady state equilibria with valued ﬁat money given the transfer function of the CB and the
ﬁscal policy of region 1. We compare steady states for diﬀerent levels of debt issued by region 1.12
Our starting point for the analysis is to study the case in which the CB commits not to make any
transfers, T(k,b) ≡ 0. This case is useful as it highlights the existence of ﬁscal spillovers: the impact of
region 1 ﬁscal policy on the steady state even for an inactive monetary authority.
Proposition 3 For T(k,b) ≡ 0, the steady state equilibrium is dependent on b.
Proof. To see that region 1 ﬁscal policy does impact the steady state equilibrium, we assume that it
does not and reach a contradiction. Suppose the region 1 government alters the level of taxes in youth and
thus changes the level of debt it issues: ∆ b
η1 = −∆τ1
y. If this change in ﬁscal policy was neutral, then
R would not change since, from (13), R does not depend on b when T(k,b) ≡ 0. In that case, region 1
agents would simply adjust their savings with the change in taxes. The change in aggregate saving would
be given by ∆S = η1∆ b
η1, where η1 is again the size of the region 1 population. Using b + k = (1 − λ)S,
∆k = (1 − λ)∆S − ∆b. If the only change in aggregate saving is due to the change in region 1 debt, then
∆S = ∆b implies ∆k = (1 − λ)∆b − ∆b = −λ∆b  = 0 when λ > 0. This contradicts the construction of an
equilibrium with neutral ﬁscal policy.
Changes in b will thus aﬀect k and hence the real interest rate and the real wage rate. The consumption
proﬁle of region 2 agents is characterized by (14) and (15). Variations in ω and R induced by the ﬁscal policy
of region 1 will alter the consumption levels and welfare of region 2 agents. The equilibrium allocation is
not independent of b
η1.
This proposition makes clear that the Ricardian result is not robust to the introduction of reserve re-
quirements. Given the diﬀerential in return between household saving and the interest on government debt,
r > R, the dependence of the steady state on region 1 ﬁscal policy is not surprising.
We study the local dynamics of the capital stock to determine the response of the economy to a change
in the debt of region 1. We do so in the neighborhood of a locally stable steady state with T(k,b) = 0 so,
from (12), σ(k,b) = 1. However, we now allow transfers to vary in response to changes in (k,b).
12We use local dynamics only to obtain signs for comparative statics. Understanding how the transfer function of the CB




dkt ∈ (0,1) at the steady state and Tb(k,b) ≥ 0, then dk
db < 0.
Proof.
The dynamic equation for the capital stock is:





o(kt+1,b)) − b. (16)
where si(ω,R,τi
y,τi




η1 − T 1(kt+1,b) and τ2
o(kt+1,b) = −T 2(kt+1,b) as in (8).

















From the region 1 budget constraint, the tax when old depends on the capital stock as well as the transfers












∂k = −T 2
k(kt+1,b).
The proposition assumes that the steady state is locally stable:
dkt+1
dkt ∈ (0,1) at the steady state. If the
CB is not responsive to variations in the capital stock, Tk(k,b) ≡ 0, then
dkt+1











As in the standard Diamond (1965) model, this inequality must be assumed to hold at a steady state.











∂k = 0. Using si
τo > 0 from consumption
smoothing, and the assumptions that si
R > 0 and si
ω > 0, the numerator and the denominator of (17) are
positive so that
dkt+1
dkt > 0. From this and assuming (18) holds,
dkt+1
dkt ∈ (0,1) in the neighborhood of the
steady state.




(k+b)2] < 0. Therefore, the denominator of (17) remains positive, using si
τo > 0. Hence, we will have
dkt+1
dkt > 0. This along with (18) implies
dkt+1
dkt ∈ (0,1).



















































db = −T 2
b (k,b). We use this to evaluate the numerator of (19). We ﬁnd:
13As the capital stock evolves, we assume that the regional government budget constraint is met by changes in taxes on
agents in old age only.
104 INSULATION IMPOSSIBLE



















= −[1 − (1 − λ)(−s1
τy + s1
τo(r − T 1
b (k,b)η1) + (1 − λ)η2T 2
b (k,b)s2
τo − (1 − λ)(η1s1
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R)Rb(k,b)]]. As noted earlier, si
τo > 0, si
R > 0
and Rb(k,b) < 0 from (13) at T(k,b) = 0. Thus Γ > 0.




If Tb(k,b) ≥ 0, the numerator of (19) is negative as each of the three terms inside the bracket is positive.
Hence dk
db < 0.
This result provides suﬃcient conditions for the spillover of debt by RG1 to reduce the steady state
capital stock. Crowding out in this case is, in fact, somewhat counter-intuitive.
If a household earns a return of R on its saving and the return on debt is r where r > R, then an increase
in government debt will lead the household to save more than the increase in b. In this way, the household
smoothes consumption in the face of the increased tax burden in old age. This expected ’crowding-in’ result
is not what we get in Proposition 4.
Our model delivers a diﬀerent result because of the binding reserve requirement. There are two con-
sequences of λ > 0. The ﬁrst, as noted already, creates r > R. The second, as is seen in the capital
accumulation equation (16) is that only a fraction of saving goes into the accumulation of capital. It is this
second eﬀect which is key to the result. While a household may want to increase saving beyond the increase
in debt when r > R, the presence of the reserve requirement means that a portion of this extra saving is in
the form of real money and not capital. Thus we obtain a crowding out result.
This proposition assumes Tb(k,b) ≥ 0. If instead Tb(k,b) < 0, an increase in region 1 debt would induce
a reduction in transfers. Anticipating this, young region 1 agents will choose to save more in anticipation of
higher future taxes. If this response is large enough, the crowding out eﬀect could be overturned.
Included in the proposition is the assumption of local stability in order to sign the eﬀect of debt on the
steady state capital stock. In this economy, local stability depends, as usual, on the properties of s( ) and
also on the transfer function. As is clear from (17), the dynamics of the capital stock depend upon Tk(k,b).
Thus another avenue for inﬂuence of the CB is through capital dynamics in the neighborhood of the steady
state.
4 Insulation Impossible
Proposition 4 indicates that an increase in region 1 debt can lead to a reduction in the capital stock and thus
inﬂuence the wage rate and rate of return of region 2 agents. In this way, there are spillover eﬀects. Moreover,
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these eﬀects also work through the transfer function, T(k,b), of the monetary authority. Proposition 4 relied
on some properties of these transfer functions in order to obtain crowding out.
Now we look at the transfer functions from a diﬀerent perspective. Can the choice of a transfer function
insulate region 2 from the ﬁscal policy of region 1? As noted in our introductory comments, one interpretation
of EMU policy design has been to construct ﬁscal and monetary policies to minimize ﬁscal spillovers.
Taking this as given, does there exist a CB policy, (T(k,b),φ
1,φ
2), which completely eliminates the
ﬁscal spillover highlighted by Proposition 3? That is, do there exist transfer functions which insulate the
consumption and thus utility of region 2 agents from the ﬁscal policy of region 1? And, more generally, are
there transfer functions which can neutralize the eﬀects of region 1 ﬁscal policy on the consumption levels
of all agents as well as the capital stock? We answer both questions in the same way: such insulation is
impossible.14 This remains true even if we broaden monetary policy to allow for two independent transfer




Proposition 5 There does not exist a monetary policy, (T(k,b),φ
1,φ
2), such that the steady state equilib-
rium levels of consumption of region 2 agents, (c2
y,c2
o), are independent of b.
Proof. From the ﬁrst-order condition of region 2 agents, (15), their consumption levels, (c2
y,c2
o), are
independent of b iﬀ both R(k,b) and their lifetime income are independent of b. By independent of b we
mean independent of the direct eﬀects of changes in b and the eﬀects of changes in b on the steady state
equilibrium value of k.


















where kb is the change in the steady state capital as b changes.
Further, given a portfolio return that does not depend on b, (c2
y,c2
o) are independent of b if the discounted
present value of lifetime income and transfers, ω(k) +
T
2(k,b)





η2 [Tb(k,b) + Tk(k,b)kb]
R
= 0 (21)
where we have used
φ
2
η2 T(k,b) = T 2(k,b).
Using ω(k) = f(k)−kf′(k) and r(k) = f′(k), −ω′(k) = kr′(k). This condition, along with the substitution




















This condition implies that the steady state level of the capital stock is increasing in the stock of region 1
debt.
If R(k,b) is independent of b, then Tb(k,b) = λ
1−λ
σ−1
σ = 0 at a locally stable steady state with no money
growth. Thus Proposition 4 holds. The fact that k is increasing in b, from (23), contradicts the crowding-out
of that proposition.
Thus if the monetary authority takes as its goal to stabilize the consumption of region 2 agents in the face
of variations in the ﬁscal policy of region 1, it does not have the power to do so: insulation impossible. To
do so, the monetary authority would have to stabilize both the return on deposits and the lifetime income of
region 2 agents. But evidently that policy is not able to oﬀset variations in ω(k) and thus stabilize lifetime
income of region 2 agents.
Proposition 5 refers to the impossibility of insulating the consumption levels of region 2 agents from
variations in b. There is a closely related result that there does not exist a monetary policy which can oﬀset
the real eﬀects of region 1 debt on agents in both regions. This is a generalization of Proposition 3: the lack




In fact, there is a stronger result. Even if we allow monetary policy to be determined by two independent
transfer functions, T i(k,b) for i = 1,2, insulation of the consumption of all agents along with the capital
stock is still impossible.
Proposition 6 There do not exist T i(k,b) transfer functions, for i = 1,2, such that the steady state equi-
librium levels of consumption for agents in regions i = 1,2 and the capital stock are independent of b.
Proof. In equilibrium, the ﬁrst-order conditions for region i agents are given by (14) and (15). These are:
u′(ω +
b
η1 − s1) = Rv′(Rs1 − r
b








Suppose, to the contrary, that there exist transfer functions T i(k,b) such that the steady state consump-
tion levels of all agents and the capital stock are independent of b. From (25), the consumption levels of
region 2 agents would be independent of b iﬀ both R and T 2(k,b) are independent of b.
With R = r(k)(1 − λ) + λ
σ, if R and k are independent of b, then σ must be as well. The growth rate of





where ˜ σ ≡ σ−1
σ and T(k,b) =
P
i ηiT i(k,b). If (26) holds for all b, given (k,σ), then








At the steady state with no money growth, ˜ σ = 0. Hence Tb(k,b) = 0.
For the consumption of region 1 agents to be independent of b, (24) must hold for all b. From this
condition, if c1
y is independent of b then so must b
η1 − s1. In order for c1
o to be independent of b,
(R − r)
b
η1 + T 1(k,b) (28)
must be independent of b. For (28) to hold for all b, it follows that
η1T 1
b (k,b) = −(R − r). (29)
Since the reserve requirement is binding in the steady state, R < r so T 1
b (k,b) > 0.
Equations (27) and (29) are two conditions on the derivative of the same transfer function in response
to variations in b. These conditions are inconsistent. Thus the consumption levels of agents in both regions
are not independent of b.
Taken together, Propositions 5 and 6 show that the eﬀects of region 1 ﬁscal policy cannot be oﬀset by a
monetary policy rule. Essentially, even a general monetary policy rule consisting of two independent transfer
functions is not enough to provide insulation. There are two spillover channels at work in a monetary
union. The ﬁrst one is linked to the remuneration of production factors, which depends on the amount of
debt circulating in the economy. The other is linked to the monetary transfers to regional governments,
associated with the implementation of a money policy rule.
A monetary rule generally depending on k and b implies transfers. There is no rule such that these
transfers do not aﬀect the macroeconomic outcome of the union and thus the welfare in any region: one
spillover channel cannot be used to nullify the other one. This is the essence of the insulation impossible
result.
Note that while the model is cast with only a single active region, the results reﬂect the marginal eﬀects
of regional debt. Thus, if the multiple regions were pursuing independent ﬁscal policies, our results would
still hold: the monetary authority would be unable to design a transfer function to insulate agents from the
ﬁscal policy choices of any single region.
5 Fiscal Policy Under Speciﬁc Monetary Policy Rules
One might argue that a typical CB does not operate through the state contingent transfer functions studied
thus far. Accordingly, we focus on some particular, more familiar, policy rules. The objective is to understand
how these rules are nested in our framework and to evaluate their inﬂuence on ﬁscal spillovers.
The ﬁrst policy rule of interest is inﬂation targeting. In our model, this is equivalent to ﬁxing the growth
rate of the nominal money supply. Since the level of real money demand is endogenous, this policy is not
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equivalent to ﬁxing the growth rate of the real money stock. Thus, as we shall see, variations in regional
debt will lead to policy responses.
The second policy rule pegs the return on deposits. While this policy has the advantage of insulating
interest rates from regional debt, it has other consequences since the process of pegging an interest rate
requires transfers to the regional governments. By focusing on these two types of rules, we are able to
highlight the indirect eﬀects of monetary interventions.
We also look at a third policy of paying interest on reserves.15 This is of interest given the importance of
a binding reserve requirement for our analysis. If the payment of interest on reserves can relax the reserve
requirement, then regional ﬁscal policy might become neutral and thus one region could be insulated from
the other.
In this analysis, we continue to assume that the steady state is locally stable. In this way, our results
build upon the crowding-out result of Proposition 4.
5.1 Inﬂation Target
In our model, an inﬂation target is equivalent to the choice of a ﬁxed money growth rule, denoted a σ−rule.
Here we assume a non-negative inﬂation target, in keeping with usual CB practice. We then discuss deﬂation
below in the context of paying interest on reserves.








where ˜ σ ≡ σ−1
σ is the policy choice. From (30), the rate of money growth determines the transfer policy of
the CB.16
For this case, Tk(k,b)) = λ
(1−λ)˜ σ > 0. So, as noted earlier, if the Diamond conditions for stability hold,
then
dkt+1
dkt ∈ (0,1) at the steady state.
With this speciﬁc policy, we ﬁnd, following Proposition 4, there is crowding out:
Corollary 1 Under a σ − rule with ˜ σ ≥ 0, an increase in b leads to a reduction in the capital stock, an
increase in the real interest rate and a reduction in the real wage.
Proof.
From (30), Tb(k,b)) = λ
(1−λ)˜ σ. This is positive if ˜ σ ≥ 0 so Proposition 4 holds.
When the monetary authority follows a constant money growth rate policy, an increase in the debt of
region 1 has the traditional crowding out eﬀect of reducing the capital stock. Though this ﬁscal policy of
region 1 does not directly eﬀect region 2 agents, the change in the capital stock leads to changes in real
wages and interest rates. These price changes do impact on region 2 agents.
15We are grateful to Kevin Lansing for questions and discussions of this issue.
16Importantly, this is not the same policy as T(b,k) ≡ 0, except when σ = 1. Else, a ﬁxed money growth rule creates new
money and the level of real transfers depends on (k,b).
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In addition, even though the CB is ﬁxing the money growth rate, real transfers are inﬂuenced by (k,b)
from (30). As a consequence, ﬁscal actions in region 1 impact (k + b) and thus real transfers to region 2
unless φ
2 = 0.
Again, referring to the European experience of the post-2008 crisis, it is clear that a Central Bank which
operates with an inﬂation target, like the ECB, may be induced to increase real transfers and thus add
liquidity when a country raises its level of public expenditures and indebtedness for stabilization purposes.
This is what has happened in 2009 and 2010 when European countries beneﬁted de facto from large ECB
purchases of bonds of various countries, as part of its quantitative easing program.
In our model, if (k + b) is increasing in b, then an increase in b will, from (30), increase real transfers.
Thus a commitment by the CB to an inﬂation target does not preclude state dependent variations in real
transfers which accommodate ﬁscal expansions.
Another avenue is through increased demand for real money balances due to increased uncertainty in the
intermediation process. In this case, a ﬁxed nominal money growth target will imply a higher level of real
transfers. The CB will again be accommodating even though it operates with an inﬂation target.
5.2 Interest Rate Targets
To eliminate this ﬁscal interaction, a CB may choose to peg an interest rate, denoted R − rule. The value
of a peg may be to insulate interest rates from the eﬀects of regional debt. This type of policy is often
thought of as the monetization of debt. While the CB can certainly act to oﬀset the eﬀects of regional debt
on interest rates, it is not be able to insulate region 2 agents from region 1 ﬁscal policy.
In this economy there are a number of candidate interest rates to target. We start with a peg of the real
return on saving and then discuss alternatives.
5.2.1 Pegging the Real Return on Deposits
We consider a CB policy to peg the interest rate on deposits, R, by making money transfers to the region 1
government. With this policy the central bank is indeed “weak”: it is forced to respond to the ﬁscal policy
of region 1.
To understand this policy, recall that in equilibrium the return R is given by




If the CB pegs R, then the rate of money growth is set such that (31) holds for all k. This makes the rate
of money growth dependent on k but independent of b. From (30), CB transfers are then determined by the
σ(k) rule that pegs R.
Corollary 2 Under a R−rule pegging R, if ˜ σ ≥ 0, an increase in b leads to a reduction in the capital stock
and an increase in the rate of inﬂation.
Proof.
165 FISCAL POLICY UNDER SPECIFIC MONETARY POLICY RULES
From (30), Tb(k,b) = λ
(1−λ)˜ σ since ˜ σ does not vary with b. This is positive if ˜ σ ≥ 0 so Proposition 4
holds. Hence as b increases, k falls.
The reduction in k leads to an increase in r. In order for R to remain unchanged, the rate of money
creation must be higher, from (31). In steady state, the rate of inﬂation will be higher.
Under this monetary policy rule, region 1 debt aﬀects both the capital stock and the rate of inﬂation.
Increased debt of region 1 is inﬂationary. The inﬂation is caused by the response of the CB to the increased
interest rate caused by the debt of a region.
In this case, region 1 debt spills over to region 2 agents through two channels: the direct eﬀect of b on
k and the induced transfers from the CB. Though the pegging of R does not neutralize the eﬀects of region
1 debt on region 2 households, it can isolate those eﬀects. This policy insulates the agents in region 2 from
the inﬂation tax induced by the ﬁscal policy of region 1.
Region 2 can be further insulated if φ
2 = 0 so that all transfers go to the region 1 government. This
restriction along with the pegging of R implies that region 2 agents are aﬀected by b only through equilibrium
wages. Once R is set, the consumption of region 2 agents solves (6) with c2
y = ω(k) − s2 and c2
o = Rs2.
While variations in b
η1 will induce a response by the monetary authority, the consumption levels in region
2 are not inﬂuenced by the inﬂation tax since R is independent of b
η1 and φ
2 = 0. As before, the wage of
region 2 agents in youth will be aﬀected by k.
5.2.2 Pegging the Return on Capital
We focused on the peg of R since that policy provides insulation from the inﬂation tax for region 2 agents
from the policy of region 1. It does so by ﬁxing the return on saving. But, as we have seen, the level of
capital and hence the wage rate varies with region 1 debt.
Alternatively, the CB could take action to peg r. In this case, the capital stock will clearly be independent
of b. But there are other eﬀects of changes in b.
Proposition 7 Under a R − rule pegging r, k is independent of b. Further, increases in b will increase the
return on saving and lower the rate of inﬂation.
Proof.
If the CB pegs the real return on capital, this implies that the capital stock and thus wages are indepen-
dent of the ﬁscal policy in region 1. This insulates region 2 from any eﬀects of region 1 debt on the capital
stock and thus on wages. But, in order for the increased region 1 debt to be purchased, the return on saving,
R, must increase. Given a ﬁxed r, the increase in R arises from a lower rate of inﬂation and thus a lower
rate of money creation. This lower inﬂation and higher R will impact on region 2 agents.
5.3 Relaxing the Reserve Requirement
Given that the ﬁscal policy of region 1 matters only if the reserve requirement binds, it is natural to consider
monetary policy rules which relax the reserve requirement. Equivalently, one can look at policies such that
the rate of deﬂation is large enough to equalize the rates of return on money and capital. This section studies
175 FISCAL POLICY UNDER SPECIFIC MONETARY POLICY RULES
the payment of interest on reserves. As we shall see, the outcome is not the same as the equilibrium without
reserve requirements.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake a complete analysis of the equilibria with interest
on reserves, our discussion serves two purposes. First, we argue that a policy of paying interest on reserves
ﬁts into our general framework. Second, we can extend our results on insulation impossible to conclude that
the payment of interest on reserves is not suﬃcient to neutralize the ﬁscal policy of region 1.
Suppose the CB chooses to pay a nominal interest of ρ on reserves. Following Freeman and Haslag
(1996), we assume that the interest paid to the intermediaries is ﬁnanced through taxation. In our setting
with regional governments, the CB “taxes” the regional governments to ﬁnance interest on reserves through
the transfer function, T(k,b). The regional governments pass these obligations to the households.
With this modiﬁcation to our model, the interest rate paid to depositors is given by:




In steady state, the CB pays out interest of ρλS, as λS is real money demand by the intermediaries as
S ≡
Pi ηisi is total saving. Thus the total tax levied on the regional governments must be enough to ﬁnance
this transfer (which is actually a tax since it is negative), T(k,b) = −ρλS. The tax depends on (k,b) since
total savings, S = k+b
1−λ, implying T(k,b) = −ρλ k+b
1−λ.
















These constraints are the same as (8) and (9) except that now there is a transfer from the regional govern-
ments to the CB in order to ﬁnance the interest payment on reserves. Of course, as indicated by these two
budget constraints, the tax on the regional government by the CB appears as a tax on old households, as in
Freeman and Haslag (1996).
With these ﬂows, the steady state consumption of old agents in regions 1 and 2 become:
c1













o = s2R −
φ
2




These consumption levels in old age have the same structure as consumption in old age in (14) and (15).
There is only a diﬀerence in the sign of the transfer since the transfer is from the households to the regional
government and then to the CB.
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Since T(k,b) = −ρλ k+b
1−λ, except for the sign of the transfer, the monetary transfers underlying the
payment of interest on reserves ﬁts into our general framework. In fact, the allocation is analogous to one
with a negative inﬂation target, i.e. deﬂation.17
In addition, we can extend the logic of Freeman and Haslag (1996) to understand the properties of the
equilibrium with interest on reserves. One of the interesting points in Freeman and Haslag (1996) is that the
choice of the interest rate on reserves has a substitution but no income eﬀect. This is because the payment
of interest on reserves eventually ﬂows to the same households who pay the tax to ﬁnance this payment.




Finally, the payment of interest on reserves is not enough to “undo” the reserve requirement and return
to the case of a non-binding constraint. Even in the one region model of Freeman and Haslag (1996), if the
government pays interest on reserves equal to the return on physical capital, thus appearing to overcome the
reserve requirement, the tax obligation of the household’s reﬂects the reserve requirement. So, in the end,
the allocation is still not identical to that arising from a model without any reserve requirement.
For our multi-region model, the analogue of that result is that insulation is not possible, even with the
payment of interest on reserves. We see that from the fact that our earlier results, Propositions 5 and 6,
cover this policy as well.
6 Market Segmentation
Our model economy has thus far assumed the free ﬂow of capital and intermediated activity across the
regions. We have focused on how the design of monetary policy inﬂuences spillovers across regions. It is
interesting to study the interrelationship between ﬁscal spillovers and market segmentation in which there
are barriers to the ﬂows of ﬁnancial and physical capital. As we shall see, these barriers can themselves
provide some insulation and can also inﬂuence the impact of monetary policy.
6.1 Financial Market Segmentation
From Corollaries 1 and 2, it appears that a peg of the return on deposits limits the ﬁscal spillovers compared
to a σ − rule. The point of this section is to illustrate that those results are quite sensitive to the assumed
capital market structure. To make this point, we consider an extreme version of our multi-region economy
in which a subset of agents hold money directly, rather than going to the intermediary.
In particular, we assume that only region 1 agents have access to intermediaries. Region 2 agents just
hold money. This can be rationalized through the existence of costs of accessing intermediaries which diﬀer
across regions.18
17One can formally show the equivalence of the outcomes under deﬂation and the payment of interest on reserves in this
environment.
18Allowing access to both forms of savings by some agents in both regions is also of interest. One could also imagine a model
with endogenous market segmentation along the lines of Chatterjee and Corbae (1992). Regions may diﬀer in terms of access
to intermediaries as well as in the distribution of income within a region. Both of these factors would inﬂuence the return to
196 MARKET SEGMENTATION
The key ﬁnding here is that the insulation from the inﬂation tax through the R−rule disappears. That
is, the inﬂation induced by ﬁscal policy in region 1 is passed onto region 2 agents. In contrast, a σ − rule
limits the spillover to the eﬀect of region 1 ﬁscal policy on real wages.
Region 1 agents have the same budget constraints and hence the same ﬁrst-order conditions as earlier.
So, (6) continues to hold for region 1 agents. Inserting the government and intermediary constraints into
the budget constraints of the private agents, we can determine equilibrium consumption levels. For region 1
which has an active ﬁscal authority, we again ﬁnd
c1
y = w −
k + λb
(1 − λ)η1 c1
o =
k
(1 − λ)η1R −
b
η1λ˜ π + T 1. (37)
For region 2 agents, their ﬁrst order condition is
u′(w − s2) = ˜ πv′(s2˜ π + T 2(k,b)). (38)
Here ˜ π = 1
π is the inverse of the inﬂation rate. For region 2 agents, s2 is just their real money demand. The
consumption levels of region 2 agents are given in (38).
Fixed Money Growth Under a σ−rule, the money supply grows at a constant rate and this determines
the transfer function T(k,b). With λ > 0, it is not possible to satisfy (37) with a ﬁxed value of k as b varies.
That is, b matters for equilibrium allocations here, as in Proposition 4.
Looking at the consumption levels in (38), region 2 agents are insulated from the eﬀects of region 1 ﬁscal
policy on the return to their saving. That is, by ﬁxing the money growth rate the CB is ﬁxing the inﬂation
rate which is the return on saving of region 2 agents. As was the case under the R − rule before, the real
wage is inﬂuenced by b. Further, unless φ
2 = 0, region 2 agents will be directed aﬀected by the transfers of
the CB. Thus when region 2 agents hold only real money balances, the σ−rule rule partially insulates them
from region 1 ﬁscal policy.
Pegging the Return on Deposits If the CB pegs the interest rate on deposits, agents in region 2 will
pay the inﬂation tax. The interest rate is again given by R = (1 − λ)r(k) + λ˜ π. As before, if b increases, k
must fall given R. This will increase r and hence ˜ π will be lower to keep R ﬁxed so π will be higher.
The inﬂation has a welfare eﬀect on region 2 agents since they hold money as a store of value. An
increased deﬁcit in region 1 induces an inﬂation tax on region 2. This eﬀect comes on top of the eﬀects of b
on the wage and the interest rate.
6.2 Complete Segmentation within a Monetary Union
We can also study an extreme case in which there are no physical capital ﬂows, no ﬂows of goods and no
intermediary ﬂows between the regions. Then the only link between agents in the diﬀerent regions is a
common currency.
holding money versus deposits. The regions with higher costs of intermediation and lower levels of income would have more
money holders and thus would be more exposed to regional ﬁscal policy that induces inﬂation.
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With region speciﬁc capital stocks, the CB transfer function would be written as T(k1,k2,b). In this way
the transfers to each of the regions would depend on the bonds issued by region 1 and the capital stocks of
the two regions.
With this economic structure, the only eﬀects of region 1 ﬁscal policy on region 2 agents would be through
the eﬀects of b on T( ). The insulation of region 2 agents could arise from the adoption of a monetary policy
which provided no transfers to region 2 agents: φ
2 = 0. It could also arise if the transfer function for region
2 was by design independent of the capital stock in region 1. If, to the contrary, the CB undertook a policy
to stabilize interest rates in the federation, then ﬁscal spillovers could reemerge.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the interplay between monetary policy rules and regional ﬁscal policies in a monetary
union. In the presence of frictions, modeled here as a reserve requirement, the ﬁscal policy decisions of one
region will generally aﬀect relative prices, and thus spillover to other regions.
Propositions 5 and 6 indicate that there does not exist a CB policy which insulates agents in the two
regions from the ﬁscal policy of region 1. A key to these results is that any attempt to oﬀset the ﬁscal policy
of one region requires active intervention of the CB through transfers. Even if the CB succeeds in oﬀsetting
the eﬀects of one region’s ﬁscal policy on interest rates and/or wages, the required intervention will create
income eﬀects through transfers.
Under some conditions stipulated in Proposition 4, increased debt by region 1 leads to lower capital
economy wide. These eﬀects impact on the wages and interest rates of region 2 agents.
The exact nature of the spillover is inﬂuenced by monetary policy. This is brought out by our analysis
of three leading policies: ﬁxing the growth rate of the nominal money supply, pegging an interest rate or
paying interest on reserves. Paradoxically, some rules that appear to be ‘accommodating’ and responsive to
ﬁscal actions of regional governments, actually mitigate these spillovers. As we have seen, a monetary rule
that pegs the interest rate may partially insulate one region from another. This insulation happens despite
the fact that the monetary authority is using an inﬂation tax to peg a real interest rate.
We have brieﬂy highlighted the fact that the insulating properties of monetary policy depend on asset
market participation of agents. We leave to future research more general study of ﬁscal and monetary
interactions when asset market participation is endogenous.
Our analysis has focused on steady states. As in Smith (1994), the choice of rules may also have interesting
implications for local dynamics.
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